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Webinar – Using the Trademark Clearinghouse for New gTLDs

Written on May 2, 2013 by

Here is the recording of the May 1, 2013 webinar entitled “Using the Trademark Clearinghouse for the New gTLDs.

On June 13, 2012, ICANN announced that 1,930 applications were filed for new top-level Internet domain names. These custom domains will be whatever the applicant desires to the right of the dot – .GOOGLE, .NEWS, or even .LOL. We covered the new gTLDS in a prior webinar. Trademark owners should consider registering their marks with the new Trademark Clearinghouse, which will provide notification of new domains that may incorporate your brand. In this webinar, we will cover how the Clearinghouse works, what it costs, and strategies for moving forward.

Come learn from Davis McGrath LLC’s Kevin Thompson during this interactive webinar. Be prepared to ask and get answers to your own questions as well.

Kevin has over thirteen years of experience in counseling clients with regard to their internet law issues.

Topics covered include:
- New gTLDs
- The Trademark Clearinghouse
- Why should trademark owners register their marks with the Clearinghouse?
- What will the Clearinghouse do?
- What won’t the Clearinghouse do?
- The Sunrise Period
- The Trademark Claims Period
- Strategies and considerations for using the Clearinghouse

Davis McGrath LLC applied for 1/2 hour of Illinois MCLE credit for this webinar. To receive credit, please send your name and ARDC number to Kevin Thompson at kthompson@davismcgrath.com, and when you viewed the webinar. Please also send him your questions.

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Here are the slides – Slides – Trademark Clearinghouse

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The next webinar will be announced soon. To learn more or to sign up for the mailing list, visit http://blog.davismcgrath.com/webinars.

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Supreme Court Ruling Leaves City Inspector General Toothless

Written on April 22, 2013 by

Imagine issuing a document request, being met with claims of privilege and redacted documents, issuing a subpoena in an effort to acquire the information requested, and being met with silence. If you are the Inspector General of the City of Chicago (“Inspector General”), you may assume outside counsel could help you enforce the subpoena in court. You would be wrong. Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled the Inspector General has no right to retain outside counsel to initiate proceedings in furtherance of an official investigation undertaken by his department. Instead, the Inspector General must first ask the Corporation Counsel for legal enforcement, or if there is a conflict then he must seek assistance from the mayor. The case is: Ferguson v. Patton, 2013 IL 112488 (March 21, 2013). Following the Court’s ruling, will the mayor permit the appointment of outside counsel to enforce the Inspector General’s subpoena in court? Stay tuned!

The Inspector General is appointed by the mayor of Chicago with the approval of the city counsel. Among his powers, the Inspector General is “[t]o investigate the performance of governmental officers, employees, functions and programs, either in response to complaint or on the inspector general’s own initiative, in order to detect and prevent misconduct, inefficiency and waste within the programs and operations of the city government.” Chicago Municipal Code §2-56-030(b) (added Oct. 4, 1989).

In accordance with the ordinance, the Inspector General initiated an investigation into possible improprieties with respect to how a former city employee was awarded a city contract without going through the typical competitive process. During the Inspector General’s investigation he submitted a written request to the city’s law department for all documents relevant to the awarding of the contract. The law department provided the requested documents; however, many documents were redacted based on claims of attorney client and work product privilege.

The Inspector General did not believe the law department was entitled to limit access to the documents. When the law department refused to reconsider its position, the Inspector General issued a subpoena directing the city’s Corporation Counsel to produce the documents. Corporation Counsel submitted a written objection to the Inspector General’s subpoena. Subsequently, the Inspector General sought and secured pro bono representation from outside counsel to bring a cause of action against Corporation Counsel. Corporation Counsel moved to dismiss pursuant to Section 2-619.1 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure arguing: (1) the Inspector General lacked capacity to sue, (2) the circuit court should refrain from overseeing disputes between two parties which are part of the same governmental entity, (3) municipal ordinances do not require disclosure of privileged materials, and (4) failure to adequately plead a cause of action for declaratory judgment and mandamus.

The circuit court granted the motion finding, among other things, the Inspector General lacked the authority to appoint outside counsel. The circuit court determined the decision to secure outside counsel was a matter which should have been left to Corporation Counsel as the attorney for the city. The appellate court reversed. However, a dissenting justice determined the decision as to whether judicial proceedings should be brought to enforce the subpoena should rest with the mayor as the Inspector General had no legal existence independent of the city.

In its review, the Court first considered whether there was a “justiciable controversy” that is, whether there was an actual controversy or “a showing that the underlying facts and issues of the case are not moot or premature, so as to require the court to pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as to future events.” Citing National Marine Inc. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 159 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1994). The Court found the case sub judice constituted a justiciable controversy as there would be a deadlock between the Inspector General, who issued a subpoena, and Corporation Counsel, who refused to comply with the same, absent a judicial determination “as to what, if any, legal recourse the Inspector General now has.” (At ¶24).

The Court then found the Inspector General was authorized to take action in response to Corporation Counsel’s refusal to comply with a subpoena. In making its determination, the Court utilized rules of statutory construction and specifically considered that the Municipal Code required no action to enforce a subpoena for seven days after receipt of a timely objection. See §2-56-040 (added Oct. 4, 1989). The Court noted that if the Inspector General is required to temporarily refrain from action when an objection has been filed, it necessarily follows that once the period has elapsed without resolution or compliance the Inspector General may act. The Court reasoned, “[i]f that were not so…. the seven-day waiting period would serve no purpose.” (At ¶28).

The Court’s final consideration was what “action” the Inspector General could take. The Court echoed the appellate court’s dissent and found the Inspector General did not have the authority to unilaterally retain counsel to initiate enforcement proceedings or prosecutions. The Court also determined under the Municipal Code the power to file proceedings in circuit court to enforce an ordinance concerning the Inspector General’s responsibilities belongs to the Corporation Counsel. However, the Court noted that in this case asking Corporation Counsel for legal representation to enforce the subpoena would be problematic and create a conflict of interest as the Corporation Counsel was the party being subpoenaed. The Court considered that the impasse over the Inspector General’s subpoena implicates the duties of cooperation and disclosure imposed on the Corporation Counsel. The Court reviewed the Municipal Code and found all officers, including Corporation Counsel, are subject to the mayor’s supervision. As such, the Court determined the matter is therefore one within the power of the mayor to resolve and that the Inspector General should have looked to the mayor for assistance.

Using the Trademark Clearinghouse for the new gTLDs

Written on April 5, 2013 by

As covered in our “New Top-Level Internet Domains” webinar, the landscape of the Internet is quickly evolving. Thousands of new top-level domains are coming online soon. Trademark owners should consider registering their marks with the new Trademark Clearinghouse, which will provide notification of new domains that may incorporate your brand. While a Clearinghouse registration will not block domains incorporating your trademark from registration, it will allow you to obtain early registration of a domain during each participating registry’s “sunrise period.” It will also provide notice of matching domain registrations made during the regular registration period.

The Clearinghouse will charge an annual fee for the privilege, so we recommend registering your core marks and those you would like to obtain a sunrise registration for.

We would also be happy to discuss your options for protecting your trademarks in these new top-level domains in more detail at your convenience.

Our next webinar, scheduled for May 1, 2013 at 12 PM, will cover these issues as well. To register, please follow this link.

Antigua May Be The Copyright Mouse That Roared

Written on April 4, 2013 by

Peter Sellers was an immensely talented British actor, known for his roles in Dr. Strangelove, Lolita, Being There, and his most famous role as Inspector Clouseau in The Pink Panther movies. He was at his peak in the 1960’s and ‘70’s.

One of Sellers’ earlier roles was in the 1959 movie The Mouse that Roared, based on the novel by Leonard Wibberley. It is a satirical story of a tiny, fictional country known as the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. Though the story is set in the Cold War era of the 1950’s, time has passed by the remote alpine Duchy, which has retained its pre-industrial economy and culture. Its economy is primarily based on its local wine, Pinot Grand Fenwick. When an American winery makes a knock-off version called “Pinot Grand Enwick” (a blatant trademark violation!), it results in Grand Fenwick falling off a fiscal cliff, its economy devastated by the unfair trade practice.

Grand Fenwick decides the best way to rectify its economic difficulties is to declare war on the U.S. The strategy is that Grand Fenwick will promptly lose the war and receive the type of foreign aid that Germany received from the U.S. after WWII. Led by Peter Sellers as Field Marshall Tully Bascomb, Grand Fenwick invades the U.S., outfitted in chain mail and armed with longbows and arrows. The warriors land in Manhattan to find it deserted (due to a city-wide disaster drill to prepare for nuclear disasters). As they wander the streets to find someone to surrender to, they stumble into a secret government lab and unintentionally capture the world’s most powerful weapon, the “Q-bomb,” capable of destroying the world. Once Grand Fenwick is in possession of the Q-bomb, the U.S. is at its mercy, and, needless to say, everything changes.

I mention this whimsical story of The Mouse that Roared because a very similar story is currently being played out on the world stage of international copyright law (relax — no weapons are involved). It involves a trade battle between the tiny Caribbean Island of Antigua and the United States. Antigua, sometimes called “the land of 365 beaches,” has a population of 82,000. For purposes of comparison, the Chicago suburb of Cicero has roughly the same population (but no beaches). In the past, Antigua’s economy has been dependent not only on tourism but also on Internet gambling enterprises that use the island as an offshore haven.

In the late 1990’s, the U.S. started cracking down on Internet gambling. It invoked various laws to prevent offshore gambling providers from accessing the U.S. market. Antigua claims it lost a $3.4 billion industry. It also says that the prohibition of online gambling violated U.S. obligations under World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. The WTO supervises international trade among its 158 member states, including the U.S. and Antigua. One of the many functions of the WTO is to provide a process for resolving disputes between its members. WTO member countries agree that if they believe another member is violating trade rules, they will use the WTO system for resolving the matter. One of the WTO agreements, called the TRIPS agreement, deals with intellectual property aspects of international trade.

A decade ago Antigua filed a complaint against the U.S., claiming that U.S. prohibitions on Internet gambling violated the WTO agreement on trade in services. This led to years of proceedings under the WTO dispute resolution process. The U.S. argued, among other things, that its ban was permitted under an exemption for “measures necessary to protect public morals.” Given that the U.S. allows gambling in places like Las Vegas, Atlantic City, and at race tracks and riverboats around the country, its “public morals” argument apparently lacked persuasive power and the WTO rejected the argument. In 2007, it found that the U.S. had violated the trade in services agreement by interfering with cross-border trade in online gambling services. It ruled that Antigua was injured in the amount of $21 million annually. The parties have been trying to settle the dispute, but to no avail.

The intriguing recent development in this case is that in January the WTO granted Antigua “authorization to retaliate.” This ruling alone would have been cold comfort for Antigua because it would have allowed retaliation only in the same sector, “trade in services.” Since Antigua does not import many services from the U.S., it would have no real leverage to retaliate.

Recognizing this, the WTO went a step further and authorized Antigua to “cross-retaliate,” that is, retaliate in a different trade sector, namely, the intellectual property sector rather than the services sector. The ruling means that Antigua can suspend its intellectual property obligations to the U.S. under the TRIPS Agreement up to a level of $21 million annually.

Like Grand Fenwick, Antigua now has control over a very large bomb. It is no longer obligated to enforce the copyrights of U.S. companies. Antigua could allow low-cost downloading of movies, music or books with impunity in order to recapture its $21 million annually. One of the goals of the WTO is to level the playing field between large and small nations, and it seems to be following that course here.

It is unclear exactly how Antigua will proceed. Harold Lovell, the country’s Minister of Finance, stated that its economy has been “devastated” by the U.S. campaign against online gambling. Antigua has indicated that it hopes to reach a settlement with the U.S., but if no accord is reached it could “move forward with the implementation of the sanctions” authorized by the WTO. The U.S. responded with much bluster in a statement by Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Nkenge Harmon that it “will not tolerate theft of intellectual property and will take whatever steps are most efficient and effective to prevent this from happening.” But is it “theft” if the WTO authorized the conduct?

Antigua is in a remarkable position. No country has ever suspended its obligations to enforce intellectual property rights under the WTO agreements before. Antigua is sitting on the “Q-bomb” of intellectual property. Like Grand Fenwick, it started out simply looking for some economic aid for its devastated industry. As a result of January’s ruling by the WTO, it is now holding a potentially powerful weapon. Stay tuned to see if Antigua pulls the trigger, and if so, whether the Q-bomb is a dud.

Illinois Courts Attempt to Distinguish SLAPP Suits From Legitimate Defamation Claims

Written on March 21, 2013 by

Lawyers and legislators are fond of acronyms. It is rare that a significant bill in Congress does not have one of these mnemonics. Everyone knows of the USA PATRIOT Act, but few realize that it is actually the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act. One of the more graphic legislative titles last year was for a bill aimed at preventing online piracy of intellectual property, aptly named the Enforcing and Protecting American Rights Against Sites Intent on Theft and Exploitation (E-PARASITE) Act. It was not enacted, but like many parasites it might return this year in a slightly different form.

The acronym spotlighted in today’s article is SLAPP — Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. The term was coined by George Pring and Penelope Canan, law professors at the University of Denver. A SLAPP is a meritless lawsuit aimed at preventing citizens from exercising their First Amendment rights. The goal of a SLAPP is to silence public critics by burdening them with the expense and distraction of defending meritless litigation – it “quells opposition by fear of large recoveries and legal costs, by diverting energy and resources from opposing the project into defending the lawsuit, and by transforming the debate from a political one to a judicial one.” Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection, 32 U. Cal Davis L. Rev. 965, 969-70 (1999). SLAPPs often arise in the form of defamation lawsuits. A concerned citizen makes statements in opposition to some activity to a school board or local government agency, and soon finds that the opponent has sued for defamation. Even if the suit is meritless, it has a distinct chilling effect.

Illinois is one of 28 states that has enacted anti-SLAPP legislation. The gist of the 2007 law, entitled the Citizens Participation Act (CPA), 735 ILCS 110/5-35, is that it immunizes from liability acts in furtherance of the constitutional rights to “petition, speech, association, and participation in government.” But even that immunity would be chimerical if the party had to endure years of cost and litigation to achieve it. For that reason, the CPA includes certain procedural safeguards requiring expedited judicial handling of motions and limitations on discovery. If the suit is dismissed for being a SLAPP, there is a mandatory award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.

The difficulty is in identifying when a suit is a SLAPP and when it is a legitimate claim. While the Act seeks to safeguard the rights of citizens to freely participate in the process of government, it also recognizes “the rights of persons to file lawsuits for injury.” In furtherance of this policy, the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that a suit can be dismissed as a SLAPP only if it is “solely” filed in response to acts in furtherance of a person’s constitutional rights. Where a plaintiff genuinely seeks relief for defamation, the lawsuit is not a SLAPP. Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E. 2d 418 (Ill. 2012). Despite the seemingly broad statutory language, the court in Sandholm interpreted the CPA not to create a new qualified privilege in defamation cases. “We simply do not believe that….the legislature intended to abolish an individual’s right to seek redress for defamation…whenever the tortious acts are in furtherance of the tortfeasor’s rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government.”

As evidenced by the Sandholm opinion, courts have been cautious in applying the CPA. A recent case of local interest, Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, 2012 WL 5239684(Ill. App. 2012), involved an investigative report aired by Fox News Chicago. The report suggested that at least four judges from the Circuit Court of Cook County had been neglecting their official duties by leaving courthouses well before the end of the business day. One of the judges, James Ryan, immediately sued Fox News for defamation.

Fox claimed that Ryan’s suit was a SLAPP, and moved to dismiss under the CPA. The court found that the suit met some, but not all, of the criteria for a SLAPP and thus would not be dismissed. The Fox News report was clearly in furtherance of its First Amendment rights to obtain favorable government action. There were also indications that the lawsuit was retaliatory and solely based on Fox News’ protected acts. It was filed within days of the broadcast of the initial segment of the four part series, and demanded $28 million in damages. This robust demand prompted the court to note that “Demanding damages in the millions for alleged defamation is a classic SLAPP scenario.”

Where Fox News faltered in its motion to dismiss was in its failure to establish that Ryan’s defamation claim was meritless. A SLAPP is “by definition, meritless” according to Sandholm. The burden was on Fox News to show undisputed facts demonstrating that the claim was meritless. Yet Fox News had already admitted a mistake in its broadcast when it showed a car parked in front of Ryan’s house in the early afternoon. It was neither his house nor his car. As Robin Robinson acknowledged in a mea culpa in the following night’s broadcast, “Our bad. While we saw the judge leave work early, we really don’t know where he went.” Fox News pointed to certain sheriff’s logs showing that the Judge Ryan’s courtroom was empty at 2:00pm on certain days, and asserted that its report was therefore substantially true. But the court of appeals held that this information was insufficient to establish that Judge Ryan left work early and went home, as was reported. “Judges work in their private chambers as well as their courtrooms, and many judges serve on committees…or are otherwise involved in the legal community. A judge’s official duties do not require a constant presence in the courtroom…or even in the courthouse.” Since the suit was not indisputably meritless, the motion to dismiss was denied. In short, if I might use another well-known acronym, it looks like Fox News, in its assertion that Ryan’s suit was a SLAPP under the CPA, is SOL.

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Davis McGrath is a law firm with substantial experience in litigation and counseling in diverse business areas. Serving a broad clientele including large and mid-sized businesses, entrepreneurs, and individuals, we also focus on intellectual property matters, with a specific emphasis on trademark, copyright and Internet law, and corporate and real estate transactions. In addition, we have proven skill and expertise in alternative dispute resolution. Read More About Us »